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PEREIDA V. WILKINSON: SUBJECTING IMMIGRANTS TO AN
UPHILL CLIMB IN OBTAINING RELIEF FROM DEPORTATION
LUCA V. ARTISTA*
In Pereida v. Wilkinson,1 the Supreme Court evaluated whether a
noncitizen2 carries the burden to prove that they were not convicted of a
disqualifying crime, such as a crime involving moral turpitude, under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)3 to be eligible for cancellation of
removal.4 The Court held that in proceedings where a noncitizen seeks relief
from removal, the immigrant carries the burden to produce evidence
demonstrating that their crime did not involve moral turpitude.5 The Court
interpreted the INA to indicate that Congress intended to shift the burden of
Ó 2022 Luca V. Artista.
*
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Robert Koulish and attorney Himedes Chicas for their invaluable time and expertise while serving
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1. 141 S. Ct. 754 (2021).
2. Consistent with recent efforts by the Biden Administration to describe immigrants in more
humanizing language, the author will refrain from use of the word “alien.” See Restoring Faith in
Our Legal Immigration Systems and Strengthening Integration and Inclusion Efforts for New
Americans, 86 Fed. Reg. 8277, 8277–78 (Feb. 5, 2021). This term is currently used in the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”); however, President Biden has undertaken efforts to
amend immigration statutes to substitute the word “alien” with the term “noncitizen.” Nicole
Acevedo, Biden Seeks to Replace ‘Alien’ with Less ‘Dehumanizing Term’ in Immigration Laws,
NBC NEWS (Jan. 22, 2021, 3:34 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/biden-seeks-replacealien-less-dehumanizing-term-immigration-laws-n1255350. The U.S. Department of Homeland
Security has encouraged its attorneys to instead use the term “noncitizen” to refer to individuals
described in section 101(a)(3) of the INA. See Memorandum from Troy A. Miller, Senior Official
Performing the Duties of the Commissioner on Updated Terminology for CBP Communications
and Materials to Staff (Apr. 19, 2021). To the extent practicable, this Note uses the word
“noncitizen” in place of “alien.”
3. Immigration and Nationality Act, Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163
(1952), amended by Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
4. Id. §§ 1229a(c)(4), 1229b(b)(1).
5. Pereida, 141 S. Ct. at 767.
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proof to the immigrant in cancellation of removal proceedings.6 With this
ruling, the Court limited the application of the categorical approach
framework intended by Congress.7 Further, the Court’s holding is improper
as it misinterprets earlier Supreme Court precedent regarding the categorical
approach.8 Finally, the Court’s judgment will hamper the administrative and
judicial efficiency of our nation’s already overburdened immigration system
and presents troubling Sixth Amendment implications for noncitizens
seeking relief.9
I. THE CASE
Clemente Pereida came to the United States from Mexico in 1995.10
While living in this country for twenty-five years, Mr. Pereida was employed
in construction and cleaning and raised three children with his wife.11
Recognizing that Mr. Pereida entered the United States without authorization
and inspection, in 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
issued Mr. Pereida a Notice to Appear for removal proceedings.12
Mr. Pereida conceded that he was deportable but requested a
cancellation of removal order from the U.S. Attorney General, asserting that
he met the qualifications13 and was eligible.14 While his removal proceedings
continued, Mr. Pereida was convicted under a Nebraska criminal statute15 for
attempting to commit criminal impersonation,16 to which he pled nolo
contendere.17
6. Id. at 761.
7. See infra Section IV.A.
8. See infra Section IV.B.
9. See infra Section IV.C.
10. Pereida v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1128, 1130 (8th Cir. 2019).
11. Pereida, 141 S. Ct. at 767–68 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 768.
13. To obtain a cancellation of removal order through the Attorney General, a noncitizen must
satisfy the following eligibility requirements: (1) that they have been physically present in the
United States for at least ten years continuously; (2) that they have been a person of “good moral
character”; (3) that they have not been convicted of a disqualifying offense such as a crime involving
moral turpitude; and (4) that their removal would cause extreme and unusual hardship to their
immediate, U.S. citizen or permanent resident family members. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
14. Pereida, 141 S. Ct. at 759 (majority opinion).
15. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-608 (2008) (since amended and moved to NEB. REV. STAT. § 28638 (2015)).
16. Pereida, 141 S. Ct. at 760 (“[A] copy of the criminal complaint against Mr. Pereida
show[ed] that Nebraska had charged him with using a fraudulent social security card to obtain
employment.”).
17. Id. at 768 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Nebraska courts have consistently found that a plea of
nolo contendere is not an admission of guilt but is merely indicative of the defendant’s decision not
to contest the charge against them. State v. Jenkins, 931 N.W.2d 851, 868 (Neb. 2019). The factual
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Mr. Pereida’s state conviction created immigration consequences in his
application for cancellation of removal. Based on Mr. Pereida’s conviction,
the immigration judge (“IJ”) found that Mr. Pereida would be ineligible for
relief if his conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude.18 Precedent
indicated that crimes that involved specific intent to commit fraud or deceit
necessarily involved moral turpitude.19 The IJ managing Mr. Pereida’s case
found that the Nebraska statute was “divisible,” meaning there were specific
provisions a defendant could be convicted of that necessarily involved fraud,
and others that did not.20 The IJ held that Mr. Pereida’s conviction fell under
a provision that necessarily required fraud, thus finding that Mr. Pereida had
committed a crime involving moral turpitude.21
On review, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) agreed with the
IJ that Mr. Pereida was not qualified for cancellation of removal, but the BIA
differed in its reasoning. The BIA agreed with the IJ that the statute was
divisible.22 However, reviewing the record from the state court, the BIA was
unable to determine which subsection of the Nebraska statute Mr. Pereida
was convicted of violating.23 Considering this inconclusive inquiry, the BIA
found that Mr. Pereida bore the burden to prove that he was not convicted of
a crime involving moral turpitude, and that the petitioner failed to satisfy this
burden.24 The BIA adopted the findings of the IJ and denied Mr. Pereida’s
application for relief.25
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the BIA’s decision, expanding upon the
lower court’s reasoning. The Eighth Circuit found that courts evaluating a
noncitizen’s conviction should apply the “categorical approach,” where the
state conviction and statute are compared with the generic definition of a

basis for the charge may not be construed as an admission of guilt. In re Verle O., 691 N.W.2d 177,
182 (Neb. Ct. App. 2005).
18. Pereida, 141 S. Ct. at 759, 760 (majority opinion). See Immigr. L.––Offenses Involving
Moral Turpitude, 37 Op. Att’ys Gen. 293, 294 (1933), for a description of crimes involving moral
turpitude, such as those involving “an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity.”
19. Pereida, 141 S. Ct. at 759–60; see also Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773, 779–80 (9th Cir.
2014).
20. See Pereida, 141 S. Ct. at 760; Pereida v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1128, 1130–31 (8th Cir. 2019)
(finding that of the four provisions of the Nebraska criminal impersonation statute, only subsection
(c), related to the carrying on of an unlicensed business, does not necessarily involve fraud).
21. Pereida, 916 F.3d at 1130–31.
22. Id. at 1131 (finding that only subsections (a), (b), and (d) of the Nebraska statute were
crimes involving moral turpitude, as they “each contained as a necessary element the intent to
defraud or deceive, thus making the statute divisible”).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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crime to determine if the noncitizen’s conviction involved moral turpitude.26
The court agreed that it could not determine which provision of the Nebraska
statute Mr. Pereida’s conviction fell under, and thus whether the conviction
involved moral turpitude.27 Despite this, the Eighth Circuit read the INA to
impose a burden on the noncitizen seeking relief from deportation to show
that they are eligible for cancellation of removal, which includes proving they
have not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.28 Considering
that a circuit split had developed on this very question,29 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review the Eighth Circuit’s holding.30
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has long recognized the power of the federal
government to remove immigrants for violating state or federal law.31
Although federal power in this arena is broad, removal is limited by
principles of due process to ensure that noncitizens have an opportunity to
challenge their deportation and to promote consistency across cases.32
Seeking to promote these ends, Congress and the judiciary developed a
“categorical approach” to assess immigrants’ criminal convictions without
having to engage in broad factfinding.33 Section II.A discusses the origins of
immigration law and the application of the INA.34 Section II.B describes the
origins of the categorical approach and its historical pedigree.35 Section II.C
evaluates the development and modern application of the categorical
approach.36 Finally, Section II.D assesses the application of the categorical

26. Id. (citing Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013)).
27. Id. at 1132.
28. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i)).
29. See infra notes 152–161 and accompanying text.
30. Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 760 (2021).
31. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893).
32. See id. at 738, 741 (Brewer, J., dissenting); United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 210 F. 860,
863 (2d Cir. 1914) (“[T]he law must be uniformly administered. It would be manifestly unjust so
to construe the [same criminal] statute as to exclude one person and admit another . . . .”), aff’g, 203
F. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
33. Pereida, 141 S. Ct. at 768 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The development of the categorical
approach originated in the judiciary as a means of increasing administrative efficiency and ensuring
a consistent disposition of immigration cases. Mylius, 210 F. at 863. Congress has implicitly
condoned this technique’s application by declining to amend certain provisions of the INA. See
infra Section II.B.2.
34. See infra Section II.A.
35. See infra Section II.B.
36. See infra Section II.C.
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approach in immigration law by different circuits when ambiguity remains
regarding a noncitizen’s criminal conviction.37
A. Origins of Immigration Law and Development of the INA
Immigration law in the United States has undergone tectonic shifts since
the Founding Era but continues to be administered by executive agencies
acting under Congress’s direction.38 Section II.A.1 explores the lasting
debate surrounding the basis of federal power in the immigration context.39
Section II.A.2 discusses the development of the INA and administrative
remedies at an immigrant’s disposal to stay their deportation.40 Finally,
Section II.A.3 provides an overview of the immigration law system, and the
legal requirements for a noncitizen to qualify for cancellation of removal.41
1. The Origins of Federal Power in the Immigration Context
The extent of federal power over immigration has long been a matter of
debate.42 The Constitution lacks an express grant of power to any branch of
the federal government to regulate immigration and the deportation of
noncitizens.43 Instead, federal authority is implied from various clauses
granting Congress and the President power to pass rules of naturalization and
to “punish . . . [o]ffences against the Law of Nations.”44 This position
received early scrutiny during the debate surrounding the Alien Friends Act
of 1798,45 in which James Madison noted46 that Congress was “exercis[ing]
a power no where delegated to the Federal Government” in exercising control

37. See infra Section II.D.
38. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (tasking the Departments of Homeland Security, State, and Justice with
the “administration and enforcement” of immigration statutes).
39. See infra Section II.A.1.
40. See infra Section II.A.2.
41. See infra Section II.A.3.
42. See Ilya Somin, Does the Constitution Give the Federal Government Power Over
Immigration?, CATO UNBOUND (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2018/09/12/ilyasomin/does-constitution-give-federal-government-power-over-immigration, for a discussion of the
origins of federal power over immigration, tracing challenges to congressional power in this arena
back to the Founding Era.
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see also supra note 42.
44. See supra note 42.
45. Alien Friends Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, 571 (1798).
46. The Virginia Resolution was drafted in secret by future President James Madison. Douglas
C. Dow, Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYC. (2009),
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/877/virginia-and-kentucky-resolutions-of-1798
(last visited Dec. 16, 2021). The Resolution was signed by John Stewart of the Virginia General
Assembly in 1798. H.D. Res., 1798 Leg., 41 Gen. Assemb. (Va. 1798), available at
https://www.loc.gov/item/ca10005182/.
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over immigration.47 Anti-federalists, such as Madison and Thomas Jefferson,
believed that states have a reserved power to regulate immigration.48
Congressional power to deny foreigners entry into the United States was
later interpreted by the Supreme Court as “necessarily exclusive and
absolute.”49 The Court regarded Congress’s ability to control the entry of
noncitizens as an integral part of national sovereignty.50 Because Congress
has this broad power to regulate noncitizens, the Court found that it was not
within its purview to assess the motives of Congress in passing restrictive
immigration laws.51
Congress’s broad power to restrict immigration was later extended to
include the power to deport.52 The Court stated that Congress’s power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations included the power to restrict
foreigners from entering the country.53 Further, the Court found that other
enumerated powers of Congress aggregated together, including the power to
control naturalization and declare war, gave the legislature the ability to
“banish”—or deport—immigrants.54 The dissenting Justices warned that the
Court was allowing Congress too much unmitigated power to generally
exclude and deport noncitizens.55 Further, the Justices indicated that

47. H.D. Res., 1798 Leg., 41 Gen. Assemb. (Va. 1798), available at
https://www.loc.gov/item/ca10005182/.
48. Jefferson’s
Draft, PRINCETON
UNIV., https://jeffersonpapers.princeton.edu/selecteddocuments/jefferson%E2%80%99s-draft (last visited Feb. 11, 2022) (stating in a draft of the
Kentucky Resolution that states have jurisdiction over noncitizens as the Constitution does not
delegate that power to the federal government). The final version of the Kentucky Resolution did
not assert that the states rather than the federal government should have jurisdiction over
immigrants, though it did condemn the Alien Friends Act as unconstitutional. H.R. Res., 1798 Leg.,
Gen. Assemb. (Ky. 1798), available at https://www.loc.gov/item/ca10005182/.
49. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889) (quoting Schooner Exchange
v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812)). For an extensive discussion of the Supreme
Court’s development of federal power over deportation and early counterarguments to it, see Torrie
Hester, “Protection, Not Punishment”: Legislative and Judicial Formation of U.S. Deportation
Policy, 1882–1904, 30 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST., Fall 2010, at 15–25.
50. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603; see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,
713 (1893) (acknowledging Congress’s power to expel and deport noncitizens).
51. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609 (acknowledging Congress’s power to exclude noncitizens
from reentry into the United States).
52. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713.
53. Id. at 711.
54. Id. at 712, 732.
55. Id. at 737 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (warning that the power granted by the Court to
summarily banish members of a particular racial group was despotic and beyond the intent of the
Framers).
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banishment should be considered a criminal punishment,56 and that the Court
should be wary of violating the due process rights of noncitizens during these
proceedings.57 With these concerns in the background, Congress soon
developed avenues for noncitizens to seek relief from deportation or denial
of admission.58
2. The Development of Cancellation of Removal Through
Congressional Enactments
Under the Alien Registration Act of 1940,59 Congress established the
procedure of “[s]uspension of deportation” to allow noncitizens to file a
motion to stay their pending deportation.60 The Act granted the U.S. Attorney
General discretionary authority to cancel the deportation of an immigrant so
long as they were eligible, and if their deportation “would result in serious
economic detriment” to their American citizen or permanent resident family
members.61
In 1952, Congress passed the INA, adding further requirements for
noncitizens to qualify for suspension of deportation, and increasing the
familial hardship an immigrant must show.62 For example, under the 1952
Act, a noncitizen could only qualify for suspension of deportation if: (1) they
were physically present in the country for at least seven years; (2) they were
a person of good moral character; and (3) their deportation would cause
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to the noncitizen’s American
citizen or permanent resident family members.63
Congress replaced the remedy of suspension of deportation with the
current procedure—cancellation of removal—through the passage of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996

56. Id. at 740 (“Every one knows that to be forcibly taken away from home, and family, and
friends, and business, and property, and sent across the ocean to a distant land, is punishment, and
that oftentimes most severe and cruel.”).
57. Id. at 754 (Field, J., dissenting) (stating that the establishment of the power of deportation
represented the growth of a separate tier of law that treated immigrants differently from citizens,
and which could lead to the inequitable treatment of noncitizens); see also Japanese Immigrant
Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (reaffirming that due process rights apply to immigrants in
deportation proceedings).
58. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 203 F. 152, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (reviewing
the denial of an immigrant’s application for admission), aff’d, 210 F. 860 (2d Cir. 1914).
59. Alien Registration Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670, 670–76 (1940).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 672 (emphasis added).
62. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163, 214 § 244 (1952), amended by Act
of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
63. Id.
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(“IIRIRA”).64 The statute updated the INA, requiring that noncitizens
seeking cancellation of removal must have been physically present in the
United States for at least ten years, and that they had not been convicted of a
disqualifying offense, such as a crime involving moral turpitude.65 The
IIRIRA also added further categories of criminal offenses which would
disqualify a noncitizen from cancellation of removal.66
3. Removal Proceedings in the Modern Context
Today, the INA continues to govern how persons are admitted into or
deported from the United States.67 Under this statute, a noncitizen may be
removed if they enter the country unlawfully or commit a serious crime while
in the United States.68 Removal proceedings are initiated when a noncitizen
is served with a “Notice to Appear”69 by a DHS officer.70 These hearings are
held in immigration court, which falls under the authority of the Executive
Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), an agency within the U.S.
Department of Justice (“DOJ”).71 An IJ is an attorney appointed and
supervised by the U.S. Attorney General to serve as an administrative judge
within the EOIR,72 and presides over cancellation of removal proceedings.73
A noncitizen is permitted representation during removal proceedings,
however—unlike in criminal proceedings—an attorney is not provided for
them.74 Due to a substantial backlog of cases,75 removal hearings are often
scheduled four to five years in advance.76
64. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
65. Id. at 3009-594.
66. Id.
67. Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 758 (2021).
68. Id. at 758–59; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (listing serious crimes that may lead to
deportation, including crimes of moral turpitude, aggravated felonies, those involving controlled
substances, certain firearm offenses, etc.).
69. E.g., Sample Notice to Appear, NAT’L IMMIGR. JUST. CTR. (June 19, 2019)
https://immigrantjustice.org/for-attorneys/legal-resources/file/sample-notice-appear.
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a); see also 8 C.F.R. § 239.1(a) (enumerating which officers may issue a
Notice to Appear to a noncitizen).
71. REBECCA SCHOLTZ ET AL., REPRESENTING CLIENTS IN IMMIGRATION COURT 1 (5th ed.
2018).
72. Id. at 2.
73. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4).
74. Id. § 1362 (permitting counsel for immigration proceedings, so long as the counsel is not
government-funded).
75. See infra notes 294–297 and accompanying text.
76. Denise Gilman, The US Deportation System Is Verging on Lawlessness, GUARDIAN (Aug.
23, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/aug/23/immigrationcrisis-us-deportation-system-lawlessness-trump-administration.
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If an IJ finds that a noncitizen is removable, the noncitizen may apply
for a cancellation of removal order. To be eligible for cancellation of
removal, the noncitizen must satisfy the eligibility requirements enumerated
in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)77 and must file a Form EOIR-42B,78 in which they
must disclose any prior convictions.79 A cancellation of removal order is
granted at the discretion of the Attorney General, however, under the INA no
more than 4,000 requests per fiscal year may be granted.80
B. Early Development of the Categorical Approach
The categorical approach has been applied in immigration proceedings
for over a century to satisfy policy objectives of the immigration justice
system.81 Section II.B.1 outlines the judicial origins of the categorical
approach, and the support the technique previously received from the U.S.
Attorney General.82 Section II.B.2 describes Congress’s implicit approval of
the categorical approach through their failure to alter certain statutory
language.83
1. The Categorical Approach is Supported by a Substantial Judicial
Pedigree
When assessing whether an individual may be deported or whether they
meet the qualifications for relief, early federal district and circuit courts
decided to develop a consistent, simple rule for reviewing a noncitizen’s
criminal convictions.84 Courts acknowledged that long-past convictions
often lack comprehensive records and that immigrants charged with the same
crime should reliably either be admitted or denied relief.85 Further, courts
sought to limit IJs’ power to conduct an inquiry into the basis of an
immigrant’s criminal conviction.86

77. See supra note 13.
78. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OMB#1125-0001, APPLICATION FOR
CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL AND ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS FOR CERTAIN NONPERMANENT
RESIDENTS
(2016)
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/10/20/eoir42b.pdf.
79. Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 764 n.5 (2021).
80. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(e)(2).
81. See infra notes 84–106 and accompanying text.
82. See infra Section II.B.1.
83. See infra Section II.B.2.
84. United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 203 F. 152, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), aff’d, 210 F. 860 (2d
Cir. 1914).
85. Id.
86. Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical
Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1690–91 (2011).
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To achieve these objectives, immigration courts adopted what has
become known as the “categorical approach.”87 Under this framework, to
determine if a noncitizen is ineligible for relief due to a prior conviction,
courts look only at the statute the individual was convicted under, without
reviewing record evidence like police reports to assess the immigrant’s
conduct.88 Reviewing only the statute, courts evaluate what minimum
conduct a defendant would have had to engage in to be convicted.89 A court
can then determine whether that individual necessarily would have had to
commit a crime involving moral turpitude, or engage in other disqualifying
conduct, to be convicted.90 As a result, IJs need not take witness testimony
or evaluate evidence like court records.91
The basis for the categorical approach is derived from statutory
language that has been employed since 1891, when Congress first established
that immigrants may be removed for criminal convictions.92 Under the
statute, “persons who [had] been convicted of a felony or other infamous
crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude” could be denied
admission.93 Upon review, federal district courts found that the “convicted
of” language demonstrated an intent by Congress for IJs to focus their inquiry
narrowly on the criminal statute of conviction and the inherent nature of that
offense, rather than the facts related to the conviction which could be found
in a state court record.94
The categorical approach developed through district and circuit courts,
and soon gained the U.S. Attorney General’s support.95 In 1933, the U.S.
Attorney General embraced the reasoning of the district courts and stated
that, in reviewing a conviction, “it is not the duty of the administrative officer
to go behind the judgment in order to determine purpose, motive, and
knowledge, as indicative of moral character.”96 Further, the Attorney
General emphasized the categorical analysis’s benefits, including that the
87. Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 762 (2021).
88. United States ex rel. Zaffarano v. Corsi, 63 F.2d 757, 757–58 (2d Cir. 1933); Shepard v.
United States, 544 U.S. 13, 22, 23 (2005).
89. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 20–21 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 599, 602 (1990)).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 21; see also Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 7 (2004) (“[L]ook to the elements and the
nature of the offense of conviction, rather than to the particular facts relating to petitioner’s crime.”).
92. Das, supra note 86, at 1689.
93. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084 (emphasis added). Congress reenacted
this statute in 1903, 1907, and 1917, and extended its language to also allow for the deportation of
any noncitizen convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Das, supra note 86, at 1689.
94. United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 203 F. 152, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), aff’d, 210 F. 860 (2d
Cir. 1914).
95. Das, supra note 86, at 1695–96.
96. Immigr. L.—Offenses Involving Moral Turpitude, 37 Op. Att’ys Gen. 293, 294–95 (1933).

2022]

PEREIDA V. WILKINSON

757

tool provides definite standards to immigration authorities to increase
uniform treatment under the law, and that it increases administrative
efficiency.97
2. Congress’s Continued Implicit Endorsement of the Categorical
Approach
Throughout the development of the categorical approach during the first
half of the twentieth century, Congress has maintained the statutory language
employed in immigration statutes.98 Today, the phraseology requiring
immigration courts to review only what a noncitizen has been “convicted of”
remains,99 even after the enactment of the INA in 1952,100 the expansion of
the criminal grounds for removal in 1996,101 and changes to the availability
of judicial review thereafter.102
Congress declined to adjust the statutory language during the debate
surrounding the INA in 1952.103 The Senate considered an amendment to the
bill which would have made a noncitizen’s deportability dependent upon the
Attorney General’s evaluation of a noncitizen’s desirability as a resident of
the United States.104 The Senate rejected this amendment, expressing
concern that the language would permit IJs to deport individuals based on
their subjective view of desirability rather than the conviction at issue.105
Senator Howard Douglas of Illinois explained that the language would allow
the Attorney General to arbitrarily determine a person’s qualification for
relief based on a subjective determination of that immigrant’s desirability.106
This would leave an immigrant with much less protection on appeal, as a
court reviewing the decision would only be able to assess the narrow question
of whether the Attorney General reasonably determined that a noncitizen was
undesirable and thus deportable.107
By rejecting the amendment, the legislature indicated that an IJ’s
analysis of a noncitizen’s state conviction is central in determining a
97. Id.; Das, supra note 86, at 1696.
98. Das, supra note 86, at 1698.
99. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (permitting the Attorney General to cancel the removal of a
noncitizen so long as they were not “convicted of” certain criminal offenses).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 62–63.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 64–65.
102. Das, supra note 86, at 1698.
103. Id.
104. Id. (discussing S. 2550, 82d Cong. § 241(a)(4) (1952)).
105. Id.
106. 98 CONG. REC. 5421 (1952) (statement of Sen. Howard Douglas).
107. Id. (“A law suit is no protection if the matter to be reviewed is as vague and variable and
arbitrary as the Attorney General’s conclusion about a person’s undesirability.”).
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noncitizen’s eligibility for relief. Congress maintained the statutory
“convicted of” language in the INA, rather than adopting a more
discretionary standard, indicating that on review, appellate judges should
make their own legal determination of whether a particular statute is
disqualifying.
C. The Categorical Approach: A Three-Step Process
Today, the categorical approach is often applied in both the immigration
and criminal contexts.108 In Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder,109 the Court
refined the categorical approach analysis when it held that a noncitizen must
have actually been convicted of a purported felony for an immigration court
to find that the noncitizen was ineligible for cancellation of removal.110 The
petitioner was convicted of two misdemeanor drug offenses in Texas and had
received a sentence of twenty days and ten days respectively.111 During the
removal proceedings, the government advocated for a hypothetical approach,
arguing that the misdemeanor convictions should have disqualified the
noncitizen from relief as they could have been prosecuted as an “aggravated
felony” in federal court.112 The Court rejected the government’s position,
finding first that the “everyday understanding”113 of the term “felony” was a
serious crime punishable by one year of incarceration, not ten days.114
Moreover, the Court noted that the term “conviction” is the “relevant
statutory hook” when assessing cancellation of removal.115 As a result, the
Court declined to find that the petitioner would have committed an
aggravated felony by “focus[ing] on facts known to the immigration court
that could have but did not serve as the basis for the state conviction and
punishment.”116 The Court declined to apply the hypothetical approach
advocated by the government, finding that “[t]he mere possibility that the
defendant’s conduct, coupled with facts outside of the record of conviction,

108. Compare Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 194–95, 206 (2013) (finding that, under the
categorical approach, the petitioner’s misdemeanor marijuana conviction should not be considered
an aggravated felony that would disqualify the immigrant from relief), with Descamps v. United
States, 570 U.S. 254, 264–65 (2013) (applying the categorical approach in the criminal context to
determine if the petitioner’s burglary offense would qualify for enhancement under the ACCA).
For a discussion of Descamps, see infra notes 127–129 and accompanying text.
109. 560 U.S. 563 (2010).
110. Id. at 581–82.
111. Id. at 566.
112. Id. at 570.
113. Id. at 574 (quoting Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 53 (2006)).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 580.
116. Id.
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could have authorized a felony conviction under federal law [was]
insufficient” to find that the noncitizen had been convicted of an aggravated
felony.117
In Moncrieffe v. Holder,118 the Court further refined the modern
categorical approach in considering whether a noncitizen’s conviction for
possession of marijuana constituted a disqualifying aggravated felony.119
The Court reiterated that the purpose of the categorical approach is to focus
on the statute of conviction and its definition, not the underlying facts of the
crime.120 In doing so, an immigration court may only find that a state offense
is a categorical match with a federal offense if that state conviction
necessarily involved facts that would lead to a conviction under the federal
definition of the crime.121 Where ambiguity remains regarding what the
noncitizen’s conviction necessarily involved, the Court explained that an IJ
should presume that the conviction rested upon nothing more than the least
of the acts criminalized under the state statute.122 Under the categorical
approach, Moncrieffe was not convicted of an aggravated felony as
remaining ambiguity meant that his conviction did not necessarily involve
facts corresponding to an aggravated felony.123
In Marinelarena v. Barr,124 the Ninth Circuit helpfully articulated the
modern three-step test the categorical approach follows. First, courts assess
whether the conviction is a “categorical match” with a federal law, or a
generic offense looking solely at the two statutes.125 When assessing a
conviction, the state statute must include elements that would be satisfied by
conduct that is necessarily narrower, or just as broad as the generic offense,
to be a categorical match.126 For example, in Descamps v. United States,127
the Court found that the California criminal statute used to charge the
defendants with burglary was broad enough to also potentially be used to
charge “a shoplifter who enters a store, like any customer, during normal
business hours.”128 Because the Court could not tell, simply by looking at
117. Id. at 582 (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3)).
118. 569 U.S. 184 (2013).
119. Id. at 189–90.
120. Id. at 190–91.
121. Id. at 190.
122. Id. at 190–91 (citing Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 137 (2010)).
123. Id. at 194–95.
124. 930 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
125. Id. at 1044 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Lopez, 864 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2017)
(en banc)).
126. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013).
127. 570 U.S. 254.
128. Id. at 259.

760

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:747

the statute, whether the defendant had been charged with burglary for robbing
a store at gunpoint, or if they merely shoplifted, the Court could not conclude
that the defendant had committed a violent felony under the generic
definition.129 Where the state statute is found to be overbroad, meaning that
the conduct could be charged as criminal under the state statute, but may not
necessarily involve conduct like moral turpitude to be committed, courts
move to the next step in the analysis.130
If the statute is found to be overbroad, it is then evaluated to determine
whether the statute is also “divisible.”131 A statute may be considered
divisible if it includes multiple, alternative elements, effectively creating
different crimes.132 Such a statute would require a prosecutor to select a
relevant element from the list of alternatives and prove that a defendant
committed the crime in the way proscribed under that element to obtain a
conviction.133 For example, in Shepard v. United States,134 the Court
evaluated a Massachusetts statute that prohibited breaking and entering into
a “building, ship, vessel or vehicle.”135 Some of these provisions qualified as
a predicate offense for enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act
(“ACCA”),136 while others did not.137 In this case, the Court found that the
statute was divisible, as it effectively defined several different crimes.138 If a
statute is divisible, a judge may be unable to determine what an individual
was convicted of simply by looking at the list of potential charges.139 If a
court cannot determine whether an individual was convicted under a
provision which involved moral turpitude when reviewing a divisible statute,
such as the statute at issue in Shephard, courts move to the third step.140
If the statute is both overbroad and divisible, only then may courts apply
a “modified” categorical approach, where limited records such as the

129. Id. at 260, 277.
130. Marinelarena, 930 F.3d at 1045.
131. Id.
132. Id. (citing Descamps, 570 U.S. at 264).
133. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 272, 277–78 (holding that, because the California statute was
overbroad but not divisible into different forms of burglary, the Court could not move to the
modified categorical approach. This concluded the inquiry, as the Court found that the defendant
did not necessarily commit a violent felony).
134. 544 U.S. 13 (2005).
135. Id. at 31 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 924 (allowing for the enhancement of criminal penalties for defendants who
commit aggravated felonies).
137. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 17 (majority opinion).
138. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009) (discussing Shepard).
139. Id. at 36.
140. Marinelarena v. Barr, 930 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
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charging document or a plea colloquy may be considered.141 Although the
modified categorical approach allows courts to evaluate documents regarding
the conviction, they may not assess the underlying facts to determine if the
defendant’s conduct itself fell under a prohibited category.142 The modified
approach acts “not as an exception, but instead as a tool,” to determine the
statutory provision of a divisible statute the noncitizen was convicted under,
and whether the elements of the state statute necessarily match those of the
generic offense.143
Where Congress intends for the categorical approach not to apply, it
achieves this by enacting different statutory language.144 For example, rather
than employing the term “conviction,” Congress may describe what specific
facts should lead a court to find that a noncitizen’s crime was disqualifying.145
In Nijhawan v. Holder,146 the Court did not apply the categorical approach as
the INA indicated that thefts beyond a certain dollar amount constituted a
disqualifying “aggravated felony.”147 The Supreme Court has found that the
use of such language indicates Congress’s intent for immigration courts to
assess the underlying conduct and circumstances of a defendant’s
conviction.148 Therefore, Congress’s use of the term “convicted of” triggers
whether the categorical approach or a circumstance-specific approach should
apply.
D. Various Circuits’ Applications of the Categorical Approach Prior to
the Supreme Court’s Holding in Pereida
The modified categorical approach assists an IJ in determining which
provision of a divisible statute an individual theoretically was convicted
under.149 Considering that provision of conviction, a judge can decide
whether an immigrant necessarily would have engaged in prohibited conduct
to be convicted.150
141. Id.; see also Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16 (noting that courts may only review “the statutory
definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit
factual finding by the trial judge” under the modified categorical approach).
142. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 267 (2013).
143. Id. at 263, 267.
144. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 38.
145. Cf. id. (finding that Congress’s decision to put a specific dollar amount into the INA for
courts to find that a defendant had committed an “aggravated felony” indicated an intent for courts
to apply a circumstance-specific approach and evaluate the nature of a conviction).
146. 557 U.S. 29 (2009).
147. Id. at 38.
148. Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 762 n.2 (2021).
149. Marinelarena v. Barr, 930 F.3d 1039, 1047 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
150. Id.
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However, in some cases, even limited documents permitted under this
rule may be unavailable or unhelpful in determining the statutory
provision.151 A circuit split developed in cases where an immigrant seeking
a cancellation of removal order was unable to prove the statutory provision
they were convicted under.152 The First,153 Second,154 Third,155 and Ninth156
Circuits have found that this ambiguity ends the inquiry as a court will be
unable to find that the noncitizen was convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Other jurisdictions, including the Fourth,157 Sixth,158 Eighth,159 and
Tenth160 Circuits, read the INA to indicate that noncitizens carry the burden
of proving that they were not convicted of a disqualifying offense, and
ambiguity regarding their conviction weighs against them.161 Considering
that this circuit split resulted in an uneven administration of immigration
laws, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine how such
ambiguities should be resolved.162

151. Id. at 1046.
152. Id. at 1047 n.6.
153. Sauceda v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 526, 533–34 (1st Cir. 2016) (finding that the categorical
approach serves to answer the “purely ‘legal question of what a conviction necessarily established’”
(quoting Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798, 806 (2015)).
154. Martinez v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that “the BIA erred by
placing the burden on [the noncitizen] to show that his conduct was the equivalent of a federal
misdemeanor”).
155. Jeune v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 476 F.3d 199, 205 (3rd Cir. 2007) (finding that the petitioner’s
ambiguous conviction did not constitute an aggravated felony, as a court “must rely only on ‘what
the convicting court must necessarily have found to support the conviction’” (quoting Steele v.
Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 136 (3rd Cir. 2001))).
156. Marinelarena, 930 F.3d at 1052–53 (finding that the BIA erred by concluding that
ambiguity regarding the petitioner’s conviction disqualified them from relief).
157. Salem v. Holder, 647 F.3d 111, 116 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that a resident-immigrant was
ineligible for cancellation of removal because they failed to meet their statutorily-imposed burden
of proof for eligibility); see also Romero v. Barr, 755 F. App’x 327 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam)
(declining to revisit the Salem holding).
158. Gutierrez v. Sessions, 887 F.3d 770, 776 (6th Cir. 2018).
159. Pereida v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2019).
160. Lucio-Rayos v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 573, 582 (10th Cir. 2017) (declining to follow the
precedent of the First Circuit in Sauceda).
161. In dicta, the Seventh Circuit expressed approval for the position of the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth,
and Tenth Circuits, however, the Seventh Circuit has never directly addressed the question. Sanchez
v. Holder, 757 F.3d 712, 720 n.6 (7th Cir. 2014). The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have not weighedin on this question. Gomez-Perez v. Lynch, 829 F.3d 323, 326 n.1 (5th Cir. 2016); Francisco v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 884 F.3d 1120, 1134 n.37 (11th Cir. 2018).
162. Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 760 (2021).
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III. THE COURT’S REASONING
Seeking to resolve the circuit split, the Supreme Court addressed
whether a noncitizen should benefit from ambiguity as to which statutory
provision they were convicted under, such that a court should conclude that
the noncitizen satisfied their burden of proof.163 Writing for the majority in
a 5-3 decision,164 Justice Gorsuch found that, under the INA, Congress
intended for immigrants to carry the burden of proving that their state
conviction was not for a crime involving moral turpitude.165 Thus, ambiguity
regarding an individual’s conviction meant that the immigrant failed to
satisfy their burden of proof and was barred from relief.166
The Court cited surrounding provisions of the INA as indication of
congressional intent to shift the burden of proof in cancellation proceedings
to the noncitizen.167 The Court noted that the INA requires immigrants
applying for relief to provide evidence demonstrating that their case “merits
a favorable exercise of discretion.”168 The statute also notes particular forms
of evidence that constitute proof of a criminal conviction,169 and states that
in cancellation of removal proceedings, the noncitizen—rather than the
government—is assigned the burden of proving “clearly and beyond doubt”
that they lack a disqualifying conviction.170 The majority reasoned that this
language demonstrates that Congress “knows how to assign” the burden of
proof and intended for the immigrant to carry the burden during cancellation
of removal proceedings.171
The Court rejected Mr. Pereida’s argument that under the categorical
approach, the ambiguity related to his conviction should weigh in his favor,
explaining that the framework necessarily involves a factual and hypothetical
inquiry.172 The Court explained that the two-part inquiry begins with a
“factual” inquiry—determining what the crime of conviction is—and ends
with a “hypothetical” inquiry—assessing whether that conviction is
necessarily a disqualifying conviction.173 The factual inquiry is uniquely

163. Id.
164. Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id. at 754.
165. Id. at 767.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 760–61.
168. Id. at 760 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A)).
169. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B) (enumerating forms of evidence that constitute proof of
conviction, including docket entries and transcripts from a court hearing).
170. Pereida, 141 S. Ct. at 761 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A)).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 762.
173. Id.
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important when assessing a divisible statute, such as Nebraska’s, as the
noncitizen seeking relief must provide evidence to show that their crime did
not fall under a provision necessarily involving moral turpitude.174 Further,
requiring the immigrant to provide record evidence resolves other factual
disputes, such as the identity of the accused.175 The Court distinguished
earlier cases applying the categorical approach such as Moncrieffe and
Carachuri-Rosendo, explaining that the convictions in those cases were
known, while Mr. Pereida’s conviction was still ambiguous.176
The Court concluded its discussion by rejecting policy arguments raised
by the petitioner. First, the majority rejected Mr. Pereida’s argument that the
Court’s approach would penalize immigrants who were unable to obtain
factual evidence due to poor record-keeping practices of state courts.177 The
Court explained that there was no such issue in this case, as Mr. Pereida
should have taken measures to preserve the state record once he had notice
of his removal proceedings.178 Further, the Court declined to assess the
merits of the government’s policy argument that noncitizens might gain a
tactical advantage by withholding evidence of their convictions.179 The Court
found that the Sixth Amendment was not implicated due to the civil, rather
than criminal, context of immigration proceedings; therefore, an IJ’s findings
of fact would not violate the Sixth Amendment.180 The Court explained that
under the INA, Congress expressly permits parties to introduce factual
evidence proving the nature of their conviction.181 By providing this avenue
for noncitizens to introduce evidence, the Court found that Congress
provided protection to noncitizens, and intended for IJs to assess record
evidence related to the conviction without it being considered by a jury.182
Writing for the dissenters, Justice Breyer stated that this case was guided
primarily by the categorical approach, not burdens of proof.183 The dissenters
noted that Congress’s use of the phrase “convicted of” rather than
“committed” in statutes like the INA indicated an intent for courts to look
only at the statute of conviction, not the underlying conduct.184 Therefore,
the dissenting Justices claimed that if a court cannot determine which
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 762, 763.
Id. at 764.
Id. at 765.
Id. at 766.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 767.
Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B)).
Id.
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 768, 769 (emphasis omitted).
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statutory provision a noncitizen was convicted under after applying the
modified categorical approach, then the IJ cannot find that the conviction
necessarily involved prohibited conduct.185 According to Justice Breyer, to
determine the conduct necessarily involved in a noncitizens’ conviction, a
court should assume that a conviction rested on nothing more than the least
of the acts criminalized under the statute.186 The dissenters noted that the
inquiry into a petitioner’s conviction is a question of law, not a question of
fact, meaning that it is unaffected by burdens of proof.187 Finally, the
dissenters warned that the Court’s holding would damage administrative
efficiency, make immigration law less predictable, and may hinge a
noncitizen’s eligibility for relief on the differing practices of state courts.188
IV. ANALYSIS
In Pereida v. Wilkinson, the Supreme Court held that noncitizens
seeking discretionary relief from deportation carry the burden of proving that
their conviction did not involve disqualifying conduct.189 The Court’s
conclusion is erroneous as it limits and improperly applies the categorical
approach intended by Congress.190 Further, the Court’s holding misinterprets
its own precedent applying the categorical approach in the immigration
context.191 Lastly, the Court’s ruling may damage the efficiency and integrity
of the immigration law system.192
A. The Court Misread Congressional Intent in the INA
In failing to apply the categorical approach and instead placing the
burden on the noncitizen to prove that their conviction was not for
disqualifying conduct, the Court misread the INA and the intent of the
legislature. Under the canon of statutory construction generalia specialibus
non derogant, provisions of the same statute should be interpreted
harmoniously.193 However, where they cannot, and unless there is evidence
of contrary legislative intent, a specific provision controls over, and creates
an exception to, the conflicting general provision.194 The majority in Pereida
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 770.
Id. at 770 (citing Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 137 (2010)).
Id. at 772–73.
Id. at 775–76.
Id. at 761, 767 (majority opinion).
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.C.
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000).
United States v. Porter, 745 F.3d 1035, 1042–43 (10th Cir. 2014).
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attempted to harmonize the provision of the INA imposing a burden of proof
with the requirement that only a noncitizen’s conviction be considered by
holding that a noncitizen has the burden of proving that their conviction was
not disqualifying.195
This Note endorses the position of the dissenting Justices, namely, that
the burden of proof language can be harmonized by maintaining the
categorical approach exception supported by the Court’s precedent and
congressional intent. Thus, the statute should be read to find that ambiguity
regarding a noncitizen’s conviction must be resolved by the existing leastacts presumption, creating an exception to the general provision discussing
burdens of proof. Under this standard, courts should assume that a
noncitizens’ conviction rests on the least of the acts which may be
criminalized under the statute.196 Therefore, an IJ need not determine what a
noncitizen was convicted of under the factual inquiry but should instead
apply the presumption to determine whether a noncitizen’s conviction is
disqualifying.197 Section IV.A.1 describes how the plain meaning of the INA
demonstrates an intent for the categorical approach to apply.198 Section
IV.A.2 notes that Congress has declined to amend the language that triggers
application of the categorical approach, despite the Court’s crafting of a new
rule in these cases.199 Finally, Section IV.A.3 discusses the absurd results
that will ensue from the Court’s novel reading of the INA.200
1. The Plain Meaning of the INA Contravenes the Majority’s
Interpretation
Through a plain reading of the relevant text of the INA, the Court should
have found that Congress intended for the application of a categorical
approach—unaffected by burdens of proof—to govern. The plain meaning
canon of construction directs courts to regard the plain meaning of the words
used by a legislature in a statute as the most persuasive evidence
demonstrating legislative intent.201 Through its reading of the INA, the
majority declined to read the statute under the plain meaning intended by
Congress for over a century.202

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 763 (2021).
Id. at 770 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
See infra Section IV.A.1.
See infra Section IV.A.2.
See infra Section IV.A.3.
United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
See supra Section II.B.

2022]

PEREIDA V. WILKINSON

767

Under the INA, a noncitizen will be ineligible for cancellation of
removal if they have been “convicted of” a disqualifying offense, including
one involving moral turpitude.203 Congress has employed this statutory
language centering on a noncitizen’s conviction since 1891.204 Federal courts
in succeeding decades found that this language provides the basis for the
categorical approach’s application.205 By using the word “conviction,” rather
than requiring an inquiry into the acts committed, the plain meaning of the
INA as interpreted in the two decades after the statute’s enactment indicates
that Congress intends for immigration courts to assess the criminal statute a
noncitizen was convicted under, not the facts of their particular case.206 Later
courts, including the BIA,207 the circuit courts,208 and the Supreme Court,209
have consistently found that the relevant statutory hook in applying the
categorical approach is the language requiring review of an immigrant’s
“conviction.”
Despite this pedigree supporting Congress’s intent, the Court’s holding
in Pereida would require immigrants to bring record evidence effectively
showing that their conviction was not for disqualifying conduct to be eligible
for cancellation of removal.210 To avoid the strictures of the categorical
approach, the Court looked to other statutory language of the INA which
states that noncitizens have the burden of proof to establish that they satisfy
the eligibility requirements for cancellation of removal.211 The majority
found that the plain meaning of the burden of proof language in the INA
indicated that Congress intended to place the burden on the noncitizen to
prove that their conviction was not disqualifying.212
The Court’s holding is erroneous.213 While a noncitizen carries the
burden of showing that they qualify for and should be granted the relief they
203. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C).
204. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
205. United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 210 F. 860, 863 (2d Cir. 1914), aff’g, 203 F. 152
(S.D.N.Y. 1913).
206. Id.; see also United States ex rel. Zaffarano v. Corsi, 63 F.2d 757, 758 (2d Cir. 1933).
207. See Das, supra note 86, at 1754–60 (chronicling BIA cases from 1941 to 1989 applying the
categorical approach and declining to review the underlying facts of an immigrant’s conviction).
208. See supra Section II.B.
209. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 580 (2010).
210. Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 766 (2021).
211. Id. at 760 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A)).
212. Id. at 764.
213. Id. at 775 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Marinelarena v. Barr, 930 F.3d 1039, 1049 (9th Cir. 2019)
(en banc) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that Congress intended to limit the
assessment ‘to a legal analysis of the statutory offense,’ and to disallow [examination] of the facts
underlying the crime.” (alteration in original) (quoting Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798, 806
(2015))).
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seek, Congress did not intend this section of the INA to abrogate the
categorical approach’s application and necessitate an evidentiary hearing
regarding their conviction.214 This conclusion is clear, given that the
categorical approach itself is intended to prevent the need for an evidentiary
hearing, as immigration courts have been limited to only looking at
“convictions” and have thus far been prohibited from factfinding
expeditions.215
Different provisions of a statute should be read harmoniously with one
another, and courts should review statutes to understand where the legislature
intended for an exception to apply.216 The factual questions a noncitizen must
prove to qualify for cancellation of removal differ substantively from the
requirement that a noncitizen not be convicted of a disqualifying crime such
as a crime involving moral turpitude.217 Proving a negative is more
challenging than proving a positive. For instance, a noncitizen can
affirmatively prove that they have resided in the United States for more than
ten years and can show that a child or spouse would be adversely affected by
their deportation.218 However, proving the more nebulous question of
whether a conviction involved moral turpitude would require noncitizens to
introduce evidence from outside the record of conviction which may be
inaccessible, and which is largely disallowed under Shepard.219
Courts have consistently found that the question of the nature of an
immigrant’s conviction is a legal question that is unaffected by statutory
burdens of proof.220 This means that neither party must prove whether a
conviction involved moral turpitude, as it is for the IJ to decide in an
administrative matter whether the underlying conviction necessarily involved
the least of the acts penalized under the statute.221 Thus, if an immigration
court, after applying the modified categorical approach, is unable to find that
a noncitizen was convicted under a provision that necessarily involved
prohibited conduct, a court cannot conclude that the noncitizen is barred from
214. Marinelarena, 930 F.3d at 1048–49 (explaining that the question of burdens of proof has
no bearing in cancellation of removal cases, as the analysis into the underlying conviction of a
noncitizen is analyzed under the categorical approach).
215. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 193–195 and accompanying text.
217. Marinelarena, 930 F.3d at 1050.
218. Id. (finding that the questions of fact involved in removal proceedings are those related to
the other three requirements for eligibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)). But see Gonzalez Galvan
v. Garland, 6 F.4th 552, 561 (4th Cir. 2021) (regarding the question of whether a family member
would be subject to “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” as a mixed question of fact and
law, rather than a purely factual question) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)).
219. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 11, 22, 25–26 (2005).
220. Marinelarena, 930 F.3d at 1048–49; Mellouli v. Lynch 575 U.S. 798, 806 (2015).
221. See supra text accompanying note 122.
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relief.222 The Court’s failure to follow the plain meaning of the INA and
conclude that ambiguity after the categorical approach’s application renders
a noncitizen ineligible for cancellation of removal is erroneous and runs
counter to Congress’s intent.
2. The Legislative History of the INA Indicates Congress’s Implicit
Endorsement of the Categorical Approach
The Court has improperly altered the categorical approach’s application
although the relevant statutory language has never been amended by
Congress. Under the reenactment canon, where a legislature reenacts a
statute with no material changes, it is presumed to have approved of earlier
judicial interpretations of that statute, and courts are expected to maintain
their consistent interpretation.223 Despite Congress’s decision not to amend
the language regarding a noncitizen’s conviction that triggers the categorical
approach, the Court in Pereida has gone against the intent of the legislature
in abrogating the rule.
Congress has used the statutory term “conviction” in immigration
statutes to indicate an intent for courts to apply a categorical approach for
over a century.224 When the INA was first adopted in 1952, the Senate was
given the opportunity to amend this statutory language, however, they
declined to do so.225 Legislative history indicates that Senators were aware
of the application of the categorical approach, and intended for a legal
analysis of a noncitizen’s conviction to continue serving as the dispositive
inquiry.226 In the nearly sixty years since the INA was adopted, Congress has
amended the bases for deportability over fifty times.227 Throughout these
amendments, although Congress has added more categories of criminal
offenses which may lead to removal,228 it has not altered the language of the
INA to modify the categorical analysis.229
In fact, Congress has rejected further attempts to alter the analysis. In
2007, Congress declined to vote on the Border Enforcement, Employment

222. Marinelarena, 930 F.3d at 1052–53; Sauceda v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 526, 534, 535 (1st Cir.
2016).
223. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 536–37
(2015).
224. See supra notes 92–97 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 103–107 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 105–106 and accompanying text.
227. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 note (2018) (listing amending acts); id. § 1229a note (same); Das,
supra note 86, at 1701.
228. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
229. See Section II.B.2; Das, supra note 86, at 1701.
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Verification, and Illegal Immigration Control Act,230 which would have
redefined aggravated felonies as only those enumerated in the INA, without
consideration of the statute the noncitizen was convicted under.231 The Act
would have also expressly placed the burden on the noncitizen to show that
“the particular facts underlying the offense do not satisfy the generic
definition of that offense.”232 By declining to take action on the bill,
Congress implicitly demonstrated that the categorical approach unaffected by
burdens of proof should continue to apply.233
This conclusion is further supported by surrounding statutory language
and the categorical approach’s pedigree. When Congress intends for courts
to conduct an inquiry into an immigrant’s conduct rather than their
conviction, the legislature indicates that desire by using different statutory
language.234 The categorical approach framework has been applied in this
way for over a century in immigration cases,235 and Congress has consistently
declined to alter it by amending the “convicted of” language in the INA.236
The Court should have read the absence of amendments to this provision of
the statute as indicating congressional acquiescence and acceptance of the
categorical approach’s application.237 In finding that the INA intended to
place the burden on immigrants to provide evidence on their conviction, the
Court misread congressional intent and constrained the long-standing
categorical approach.238
3. The Court’s Interpretation of the INA Will Lead to Absurd Results
The Court’s holding will nullify the categorical approach’s application
in certain immigration cases, which may lead to absurd results for noncitizens
seeking relief. Under the absurdity canon of construction, in interpreting
legislative enactments, statutes should be read to avoid absurd results the

230. H.R. 4065, 110th Cong. § 201(a)(3)(iii) (2007).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Das, supra note 86, at 1701.
234. See supra notes 144–148 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 92–106 and accompanying text (outlining the century-long development of
the categorical approach, its reasoning, and the favorable application it has received from the various
branches of government).
236. See supra text accompanying notes 99–106 (explaining that the INA continues to use the
trigger word “conviction,” indicating Congress’s desire for the categorical approach).
237. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 11, 23 (2005); see also Descamps v. United States, 570
U.S. 254, 267–68 (2013) (explaining that statutes like the INA were thoroughly considered by
Congress and intended for courts to treat all convictions in the same manner without looking to an
individual’s underlying conduct).
238. Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 776–77 (2021) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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legislature could not have intended.239 In placing the burden of proof on a
noncitizen to prove what their conviction necessarily demonstrates, the
Court’s holding may lead to absurdities Congress could not have intended
because the rule relies heavily on an immigration court’s review of state
criminal records, which are often ambiguous or poorly maintained.240
Courts have consistently found that one of the primary purposes of the
categorical approach is to promote uniformity.241 By finding that ambiguity
regarding a noncitizen’s conviction results in that immigrant being ineligible
for cancellation of removal, the Court’s rule will require immigration courts
to rely on state criminal court documents which are often unavailable or
incomplete.242
Requiring IJs to conduct a holistic review of state court documents to
determine the factual basis of a noncitizens’ conviction will lead to absurd
results. State court records of misdemeanor convictions (which crimes
involving moral turpitude tend to be)243 are often not kept “on the record,”
meaning that no court reporter has memorialized the guilty plea or
conviction.244 The information recorded varies between state courts.245
Court reporters may not be required to record specific information such as
the statutory subsection or factual basis for the plea.246 For example, in
Montgomery County, Maryland, plea forms used at the state district and
circuit courts omit the statutory subsection of the conviction.247 The U.S.
Supreme Court is aware of this concern, as it has consistently lamented the
fact that state court records are often incomplete and unreliable in expressing
its support for the categorical approach.248

239. Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892).
240. Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 4–24, Pereida v. Barr, 141 S. Ct. 754 (2021) (No. 19-438), 2020 WL 583960
[hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief for NACDL].
241. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 201, 205 n.11 (2013); Descamps, 570 U.S. at 268
(explaining that, under the ACCA, specific convictions are intended to serve “as an on-off switch,”
where certain convictions will always result in enhancements, while others will not, without looking
at an actor’s conduct); see also supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
242. Pereida, 141 S. Ct. at 775–76.
243. Amici Curiae Brief for NACDL, supra note 240, at 4.
244. Id. at 7–10.
245. Id. at 10.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 202–03 (2013); Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
2243, 2253 (2016); see also United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2344 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (finding that the categorical approach prevents courts from having to assess decades old
documents that may lack factual detail).
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These inconsistent and often incomplete recording practices of state and
local courts will have absurd results where a noncitizen’s ability to obtain
relief depends on whether their conviction was adequately preserved. Even
where the criminal record is preserved, immigration courts may be uncertain
about what the document means, and statements of fact found in these records
may be “downright wrong.”249 The categorical approach is necessary as it
prevents the re-litigation of past convictions250 and protects noncitizens from
inaccuracies which may haunt them years down the road.251
Congress intends to reserve deportation primarily as a penalty for
dangerous noncitizens whose crimes may pose a danger to the public. Under
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C), in addition to noncitizens convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude, Congress denies cancellation of removal relief
from those convicted of crimes involving human trafficking,252 sex
offenses,253 controlled substances,254 and domestic violence,255 among other
things. Meanwhile, noncitizens who are granted cancellation orders are those
convicted only of low-level offenses, and whose deportation would result in
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to an immediate family
member of the noncitizen, who must be a U.S. citizen, or otherwise lawfully
permitted to live in the United States.256 Under the Court’s construction of
the INA, however, the Attorney General will not deport noncitizens based on
the heinousness of their conviction, but instead on the record keeping
practices of state courts. Family members of these individuals, who are often
U.S. citizens, will lose their loved ones due to the mere failure of a clerk to
adequately maintain the record, running directly contrary to the purpose of
the statute.257 Surely Congress could not have intended such absurd results.
B. The Court Misinterpreted Its Own Precedent Regarding the
Categorical Approach
In rendering its holding in Pereida, the Court “cast a blind eye over a
good many precedents.”258 The Court supported its finding that immigrants
carry a burden of proof in cancellation of removal proceedings by asserting

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 270 (2013).
Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 200–01.
Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2253.
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(F).
Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(v).
Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B).
Id. § 1227(a)(2)(E).
Id. § 1229b(b)(1).
Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 764 (2021).
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that lingering ambiguity that remains after the application of the modified
categorical approach must be resolved by considering the record of
conviction.259 Although the Court agreed that the categorical approach ought
to apply, and that only limited documents should be considered, the majority
found that when a review of these records proves fruitless and ambiguity
remains, the result is that the noncitizen has failed to meet their purported
burden of proof in cancellation proceedings.260
The Court’s reading of the INA is inconsistent with its earlier precedent
interpreting the categorical approach. Notably, in cases where ambiguity
remains regarding a noncitizen’s conviction, the Court has declined to review
further court records as evidence.261 Instead, where an IJ cannot determine
what provision of a statute a noncitizen was convicted under by reviewing
the record materials, the categorical approach’s “demand for certainty”
cannot be satisfied.262 This is because an immigration court assessing a
noncitizen’s eligibility for relief should center their inquiry on what acts the
defendant necessarily would have committed to be convicted.263 Under the
categorical approach, the IJ must presume that the conviction rested on
nothing more than the least of the acts criminalized, meaning that any
ambiguity should be construed in the noncitizen’s favor.264
In rendering its holding, the Court distinguished its earlier decisions in
Carachuri-Rosendo and Moncrieffe, asserting that they addressed only
whether the minimum conduct for the noncitizen’s known offenses triggered
adverse immigration consequences.265 These cases, however, should not be
so quickly cast aside. In Carachuri-Rosendo, the Court found that an
immigrant’s misdemeanor drug charges should not result in ACCA
aggravation penalties, as immigration courts should not apply a hypothetical
approach and construe facts to find ex post that a state offense could be
enhanced to produce a greater penalty under federal law.266 The case
established as a matter of interpretation that “ambiguities in criminal statutes

259. Id. at 761.
260. Id. at 761–63.
261. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2257 (2016).
262. Id. (quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 21 (2005)).
263. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190–91 (2013) (citing Johnson v. United States, 559
U.S. 133, 137 (2010)).
264. See supra notes 118–122 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 108–123, 176 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 108–117 and accompanying text; see also Laura Jean Eichten, A Felony, I
Presume? 21 USC § 841(b)’s Mitigating Provision and the Categorical Approach in Immigration
Proceedings, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1093, 1128 (2012).
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referenced in immigration laws should be construed in the noncitizen’s
favor.”267
Further, in Moncrieffe, the Court found that the petitioner’s conviction
for possessing marijuana was not an aggravated felony, reversing his removal
order.268 The Court applied the categorical approach to review this
conviction, and acknowledged that a state offense is only a categorical match
if it necessarily involved conduct which would be punishable under the
generic federal version of the crime.269 The Court rejected the government’s
contention that ambiguity regarding the noncitizen’s conviction should be
resolved by allowing them to present evidence regarding their convictions.270
This is because the Court warned that, among other things, such an approach
may lead to cases where “two noncitizens, each ‘convicted of’ the same
offense, might obtain different aggravated felony determinations depending
on what evidence remains available or how it is perceived by an individual
immigration judge. The categorical approach was designed to avoid this
‘potential unfairness.’”271
In reaching its holding in Moncrieffe, the Court did not find that the
government had the burden of establishing that the noncitizen was
removable.272 The Court did not discuss burdens of proof in that case.273
Instead, relying on the categorical approach, ambiguity as to whether Mr.
Moncrieffe’s conviction was a categorical match simply meant that the
conviction did not necessarily involve the minimum conduct needed to be
considered an aggravated felony.274 The Court in Pereida declined to review
its holding in Moncrieffe, asserting that the case is inapposite as it only
considered whether the minimum conduct needed to commit the noncitizen’s
known offense would necessarily lead to immigration consequences.275
While this may be true, it would certainly be expected that the Court mention
that the government has the burden of proving removability by clear and

267. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 581 (2010) (citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543
U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004)).
268. Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 190, 206.
269. Id. at 190–91.
270. Id. at 200.
271. Id. at 201 (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601 (1990)).
272. Cf. Tanika Vigil, An Unjust Burden: The Tenth Circuit’s Misapplication of the Categorical
Approach in Lucio-Rayos v. Sessions, 96 DENV. L. REV. 369, 386 (2019) (discussing the holding
of the Tenth Circuit in Lucio-Rayos, which reached the same conclusion as the Court in Pereida by
also relying on a purported burden of proof determination).
273. Id.
274. Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 194–95.
275. Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 765 (2021).
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convincing evidence.276 Instead, the Court made no mention of burdens of
proof, indicating that these burdens do not impact the purely legal question
of whether a state conviction would categorically be considered a crime
involving moral turpitude.277
In fact, the Court noted that regardless of whether a noncitizen is
bringing an action for cancellation of removal or the Government is seeking
to prove removability, the “analysis is the same in both contexts.”278 Other
circuit courts have suggested that in footnote four of Moncrieffe the Supreme
Court intended to show that the categorical analysis applies in both
contexts,279 though applying a different standard would lead to peculiar
results.280 Namely, under this burden of proof approach, a noncitizen would
not be removable for committing a crime involving moral turpitude if there
is ambiguity in the record. However, if they instead concede that they are
deportable and petition for cancellation of removal, they would be ineligible
for relief.281 For instance, say two noncitizens have been convicted of the
same crime for the same act, and the same ambiguity exists in each of their
state conviction records. Noncitizen A challenges the government’s
deportation action, and because the government is unable to carry the burden
the Court in Pereida has placed on them, Noncitizen A is not deported.
Meanwhile, Noncitizen B concedes that they are removable, but instead
petitions for a cancellation of removal order. Noncitizen B would be unable
to carry this burden of proof and thus would not be granted relief. The
categorical approach is intended to prevent these inconsistent results that the
Court’s holding will now create.282 The Court should have found that the
review of a noncitizen’s conviction is a legal question unaffected by burdens
of proof.283 In holding otherwise, the Court cast aside crucial precedent
which will lead to the inconsistent results the categorical approach is
designed to prevent.
C. The Court’s Holding Will Harm the Administration of Law and
Defies the Spirit of the Sixth Amendment
By placing the burden on a noncitizen to affirmatively prove that their
conviction was not disqualifying, the Court’s holding will have lasting policy
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Vigil, supra note 272, at 387.
Vigil, supra note 272, at 387–88.
Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 191 n.4.
E.g., Lucio-Rayos v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 573, 583 (10th Cir. 2017).
Marinelarena v. Barr, 930 F.3d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
Id. (citing Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 187).
Id. at 1048–49.
E.g., id. at 1049; Sauceda v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 526, 534 (1st Cir. 2016).
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implications. The Court’s burden-shifting framework will expand the
responsibilities of an already overburdened immigration law system.284
Moreover, this burden will rest heavily on noncitizens who may lack access
to representation in an immigration court system that is largely stacked
against them.285
1. The Court’s Holding Will Damage the Judicial and Administrative
Efficiency of the Immigration Law System
The Court’s holding will strain the administrative system, as it will
require IJs in cancellation of removal proceedings to engage in intensive
factfinding.286 Federal courts have long recognized the importance of the
“efficient administration” of law in immigration proceedings.287 However,
by placing the burden of proof on the immigrant in cancellation of removal
proceedings, immigration courts would be expected to effectively conduct
“minitrials” on a noncitizen’s conviction.288 This may require administrative
judges to hear testimony and make factual findings on an immigrant’s
conduct where state court documents are unavailable.289 This task would be
further hampered if a court is unable to locate witnesses such as state
prosecutors who have since retired, or if a witness’s memory about the crime
has faded.290
The Court’s holding would have immigration courts engage in
factfinding that they are ill-equipped to conduct.291 IJs have substantial
dockets292 and lack reliable access to information regarding the immigrant’s
conviction to conduct these minitrials.293 Courts have noted that the

284. See infra Section IV.C.1.
285. See infra Section IV.C.2.
286. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 201 (2013).
287. Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 582 F.3d 462, 478–79 (3rd Cir. 2009) (quoting United
States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 203 F. 152, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1913)); see, e.g., Gertsenshteyn v. U.S.
Dep’t of Just., 544 F.3d 137, 146 (2d Cir. 2008); Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 613, 621 (9th Cir.
2004).
288. Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 201.
289. Id.
290. Id.; Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 775 (2021) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also supra
notes 243–257 and accompanying text (discussing the absurd results that will arise if IJs engage in
factfinding expeditions during cancellation of removal proceedings).
291. Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798, 806 (citing Jennifer L. Koh, The Whole Better than the
Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime,
26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 295 (2012)); Pereida, 141 S. Ct. at 775.
292. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
293. Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 201 (citing Robert A. Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the
Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3, 5–10 (2008)); Pereida, 141 S.
Ct. at 775.
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immigration system is already overburdened, and their caseload is evergrowing.294 A report by the EOIR found that the number of pending cases in
the immigration system increased from 460,086 at the end of the 2015 fiscal
year to 1,399,680 at the end of 2021.295 During the period from 2015 to 2020,
immigration courts saw a 90.2% increase in the number of initially filed
cases.296 However, in 2021, the number of completed cases dropped
significantly, down from 231,718 in 2020, to 114,751 at the end of 2021.297
This marks the second year in a row that the total number of EOIR
completions has dropped although pending cases have increased at an
alarming rate.298 Expecting these courts to engage in this laborious
factfinding risks imposing a severe burden on our nation’s already
overburdened immigration courts.299
Further, one of the great benefits of the categorical approach is that it
saves IJs substantial time.300 The categorical approach prevents IJs from
having to review underlying documents concerning a noncitizens’
conviction, which may be unavailable.301 Instead, by making a legal
determination of what a noncitizen’s conduct necessarily involved, an
immigration court can consistently and quickly determine whether a
conviction disqualifies an immigrant from relief.302 By requiring noncitizens
to prove that their conviction was not for disqualifying conduct, the Court
has limited the immigration justice system’s ability to rely on one of its
greatest efficiency tools.303 The Court’s holding will necessarily hamper the
system’s ability to dispose of cases in an efficient and effective manner.

294. Adjudication Statistics, EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (Oct. 19, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1242166/download.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 200–01 (2013).
300. Brief for Former United States Immigration Judges and Members of the Board of
Immigration Appeals as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 19, Pereida v. Barr, 141 S. Ct. 754
(2021) (No. 19-438), 2020 WL 598384 [hereinafter Amici Brief for Immigration Judges].
301. Id. at 15, 19.
302. Id.; see also Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 264 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The BIA’s categorical
approach to moral turpitude determinations promotes uniformity and relieves the [Immigration and
Naturalization Service] of the oppressive administrative burden of scrutinizing the specific conduct
giving rise to criminal offenses.”).
303. Amici Brief for Immigration Judges, supra note 300, at 15, 19.
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2. The Court’s Holding Will Have Harmful Sixth Amendment
Implications for Immigrants Seeking a Cancellation of Removal
Order
As the Court in Pereida noted, this burden of proof in cancellation
proceedings will leave immigrants “with an uphill climb.”304 However, even
this remark is an understatement. Circumstances unique to noncitizens
already deprive them of access to justice, and the Court’s decision will cause
this steep burden to seem more like a trek up the side of a mountain. The
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees broad
protections to criminal litigants, including the right to a trial before an
impartial jury, the right to tender evidence and confront witnesses in one’s
own defense, and the right to be represented by counsel.305 Despite
immigration proceedings being regarded as civil, courts should be mindful
that a close nexus exists between immigration decisions and criminal
convictions, and vice-versa.306 There may be substantial “crimmigration”307
consequences for noncitizens based on the outcome of their cases, including
the most “‘drastic measure’ of deportation.”308 Considering the connection
between criminal law and immigration proceedings, courts should extend the
spirit of the Sixth Amendment to provide protections during immigration
proceedings.309
Although the penalties involved in removal proceedings may be
substantial, immigrants are not provided legal counsel for these hearings, as
they are regarded as civil, not criminal.310 As a result, immigrants often
represent themselves pro se, and thus are unaware that they are expected to
preserve state conviction records or obtain other documents in their favor,311
304. Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 760 (2021).
305. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)
(guaranteeing counsel to indigent criminal defendants under the Sixth Amendment).
306. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365–66 (2010).
307. The term “crimmigration” highlights the draconian nexus between immigration and
criminal law where violations of either create substantial consequences in the parallel legal system.
Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L.
REV. 367, 376 (2006). The term is derived from the immigration policies enacted in the 1990s,
which largely obscured the boundaries between crime control and immigration law. Robert
Koulish, COVID-19 and the Creeping Necropolitics of Crimmigration Control, SOC. SCIS., Dec.
2021, at 1–2.
308. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360 (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)).
309. Id. at 366, 373.
310. Das, supra note 86, at 1681 n.46; see also supra note 180 and accompanying text; 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(b)(4)(A).
311. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 201 (2013); see also Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct.
754, 776 (2021) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“And even where complete records do exist, noncitizens,
who often are unrepresented, detained, or not fluent English speakers, may not have the resources
to offer more than their own testimony.” (citing Brief for Immigrant Defense Project et al. as Amici
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especially when they are incarcerated pending their hearing.312 Only thirtyseven percent of all immigrants are represented in removal cases.313
Immigrants who are detained while they face deportation are only
represented fourteen percent of the time.314 Immigrants represented by
counsel are four times more likely to be released from detention, and eleven
times more likely to seek relief such as asylum.315 A detained immigrant
represented by counsel is twice as likely to be granted the relief they seek,
and a represented immigrant who has never been detained is five times more
likely than an individual who was detained to obtain relief.316 Although
noncitizens represented by counsel are more likely to be granted relief,
immigrants facing removal often come before immigration courts
unrepresented and unprepared to adequately defend themselves. By placing
the burden on an immigrant seeking relief, the Court in Pereida exacerbates
this existing disadvantage and will lead more noncitizens to suffer criminallike consequences such as deportation without the benefit of counsel.
A factfinding proceeding would also have a negative impact on the
adjacent criminal law system. The Court’s holding may deprive noncitizens
of the benefits of their pleas. Many individuals choose to plead their criminal
cases to avoid facts of their conviction from becoming public.317 Further,
many immigrant-defendants plead to offenses in divisible statutes to avoid
adverse immigration consequences, such as deportation.318 In many state
criminal courts, prosecutors and defense attorneys employ what has become
known as the safe-harbor plea option.319 Under this practice, in negotiating
plea deals for immigrant-criminal defendants, prosecutors and defense
attorneys will fashion a criminal penalty that avoids consequences like

Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11–19, Pereida v. Barr, 141 S. Ct. 754 (2021) (No. 19-438), 2020
WL 598382)).
312. Das, supra note 86, at 1685.
313. Ingrid Eagly & Steven Shafer, Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, AM. IMMIGR.
COUNCIL (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/access-counselimmigration-court.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 771 (2021) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
318. Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798, 806 (2015) (citing Jennifer L. Koh, The Whole Better than
the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of
Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 307 (2012)).
319. Brief for Immigrant Defense Project et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10–11,
Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) (No. 16-327), 2017 WL 605175 [hereinafter Amici
Brief for Immigrant Defense Project].
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deportation.320 For example, this settlement often arises when defense
attorneys seek to avoid a theft aggravated felony, which may qualify as an
“aggravated felony” if the sentence imposed exceeds one year.321 Consider
a noncitizen who is convicted of petit larceny and receives a twelve-month
suspended sentence.322 Under the INA, a sentence exceeding one year would
be considered an aggravated felony and would necessarily result in the
deportation of that immigrant.323 To prevent this, prosecutors and defense
attorneys will negotiate a plea deal that does not result in a sentence
exceeding one year.324
The categorical approach’s legal-based inquiry allows for safe-harbor
plea deals by making immigration consequences predictable.325 For example,
where a state statute is known to be divisible and ambiguous, a prosecutor
may seek a conviction under that statute with the understanding that it will
not lead to deportation for the defendant. However, the Court’s ruling in
Pereida, which applies an evidence-intensive inquiry in cancellation of
removal proceedings, will limit the predictability that allows for safe-harbor
pleas.326
The novel evidence-based inquiry will lead to differing
consequences for an immigrant depending on facts in the record and what an
IJ concludes the conviction necessarily involved.327
By removing
predictability, the Court’s decision deprives immigrants and prosecutors of
that safe-harbor plea option in certain cases, which has consistently been
recognized as beneficial to the administration of law.328
The Court’s holding is also inconsistent with precedent indicating that
noncitizens must be adequately advised of the immigration consequences of
their guilty pleas under the Sixth Amendment. State courts have indicated
their intent for immigrants to be well-advised of potential immigration
consequences, and for prosecutors and defense attorneys to avoid substantial

320. Id.; Jennifer L. Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach
to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 307 (2012);
accord Mellouli, 575 U.S. at 806.
321. Amici Brief for Immigrant Defense Project, supra note 319, at 11 (citing 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(G)).
322. See Zemene v. Clark, 768 S.E.2d 684, 687 (Va. 2015) (noting that a noncitizen defendant
received a twelve-month suspended sentence in exchange for their guilty plea to petit larceny).
323. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)); Amici Brief for Immigrant Defense Project, supra
note 319, at 11 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G)).
324. Amici Brief for Immigrant Defense Project, supra note 319, at 11.
325. Koh, supra note 320, at 307.
326. Id.
327. See supra Section II.B.1.
328. E.g., Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798, 806 (2015); Jimenez-Cedillo v. Sessions, 885 F.3d
292, 300 (4th Cir. 2018).
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penalties in certain cases.329 Early decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court
emphasized the need for due process in immigration proceedings.330 More
recently, in Padilla v. Kentucky,331 the Court found that immigrant clients
must formally and accurately be advised of the crimmigration consequences
of their conviction.332 The Court recognized the important role of defense
counsel in preserving a noncitizen’s right to remain in the United States,
including by advising a noncitizen on whether to accept a safe-harbor plea
deal or proceed to trial.333 Thus, the consequences of a conviction must be
consistent and predictable so that immigration and criminal defense attorneys
can provide constitutionally sufficient advice to noncitizens.334
A retrial of the facts of an immigrant’s conviction before an IJ may also
have Sixth Amendment implications. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the
right of accused persons to have a trial by impartial jury.335 Under the Court’s
approach in Pereida, however, the facts underlying a conviction would be
assessed by an IJ, rather than a jury.336 Permitting a judge to hear testimony
alone and decide whether the conduct in a noncitizen’s conviction
disqualifies them from relief is inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee of a jury trial.337 Thus, the evidence-intensive inquiry that the
329. Zemene v. Clark, 768 S.E.2d 684, 692 (Va. 2015) (“[T]he court’s consideration of the
rationality of a decision whether to accept or reject a plea agreement must include a properly advised
defendant’s desire to avoid a negative impact on his immigration status.”).
330. See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
331. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
332. Id. at 372, 373.
333. Id. at 368 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001)).
334. When the categorical approach is strictly applied, it serves as a powerful tool for defense
attorneys to protect their clients from deportation by allowing them to more zealously pursue safeharbor plea deals and avoid the risk of deportation altogether. Koh, supra note 320. Moreover, the
categorical approach balances power between federal immigration officials and state criminal
justice actors who are closer in time and relation to the offense. Id. at 308. At the criminal
proceedings stage, state-level actors—such as judges and prosecutors—may discretionarily grant
safe-harbor pleas, and as a result, provide some input on a noncitizen’s deportability. Id.; see also
supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text (discussing the debate surrounding the Alien Friends Act
of 1798 and Thomas Jefferson and James Madison’s position that noncitizens should be subjected
primarily to the jurisdiction of the state they are in).
335. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”).
336. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 269 (2013). The Court explained that although
an immigrant pleaded guilty to the alleged crime and was convicted as a result, the facts of their
crime were never submitted to a proper factfinder. Id. Additionally, in plea proceedings, courts
have found that defendants have little incentive to challenge or correct factual allegations, meaning
that some of the findings of a trial court may be “downright wrong.” Id. at 270; see also supra note
17 (noting that in Nebraska, a plea of nolo contendre is not an admission of guilt, but simply means
that a defendant is not contesting the charge against them).
337. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 269 (“[O]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
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Court’s holding necessitates is improvident, as it is contrary to the spirit of
the Sixth Amendment.338
This incongruence with the Sixth Amendment is even more pronounced
when one considers the fundamental flaws and unfairness built into the
immigration “justice” system.339 The current structure of the immigration
law system places IJs and the BIA under the jurisdiction and control of the
DOJ, a prosecutorial executive agency.340 During the relief stage, the
government has an interest in expeditiously reviewing an immigrant’s
application for relief,341 which is further exacerbated by the substantial
backlog of cases the EOIR faces.342 Serving under the purview of the DOJ,
commentators have noted that IJs themselves struggle to maintain the
impartiality that is crucial to the equitable disposition of immigration
cases.343 Leaders in the immigration community bely the fiscal neglect the
immigration system has faced, and the politicization of the immigration
system over the past few decades.344 IJs are evaluated based on the number
of immigration cases they review in a given year345—under the direction of
Attorney General Jeff Sessions “all immigration judges [were required to]
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490
(2000))).
338. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 25–26 (2005) (plurality opinion); see also Edward
J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)
(reaffirming that courts should read statutes to avoid conflict with the Constitution).
339. E.g., Gregory Chen, The Urgent Need to Restore Independence to America’s Politicized
Immigration Courts, JUST SEC. (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/73337/the-urgentneed-to-restore-independence-to-americas-politicized-immigration-courts/; Tanvi Misra, DOJ
Changed Hiring to Promote Restrictive Immigration Judges, ROLL CALL (Oct. 29, 2019, 2:51 PM),
https://www.rollcall.com/2019/10/29/doj-changed-hiring-to-promote-restrictive-immigrationjudges/.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 71–73 (explaining the structure of the immigration law
system within the DOJ); Chen, supra note 339.
341. Christen Chapman, Relief from Deportation: An Unnecessary Battle, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1529, 1561 (2011).
342. See supra notes 294–297 and accompanying text.
343. E.g., Chapman, supra note 341, at 1566, 1572–73 (finding that IJs may make deportation
decisions based on limited information presented by government counsel and instead advocating
for a non-adversarial immigration review system); Panelists Debate How to Fix a Broken
Immigration
Court
System,
A M.
BAR
ASS’N
(June
2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/publications/youraba/2018/june-2018/panelistsdebate-how-to-fix-a-broken-immigration-court-system/ (“Judge Denise Slavin of Baltimore,
representing the National Association of Immigration Judges, said the immigration system deserves
a grade of D or D-minus.”).
344. Panelists Debate How to Fix a Broken Immigration Court System, supra note 343.
345. EOIR Performance Plan: Adjudicative Employees, EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (Apr.
2018), https://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2018/images/04/02/immigration-judges-memo.pdf (archiving the
performance evaluation sheet used by the DOJ under Attorney General Jeff Sessions to evaluate all
IJs).
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clear at least 700 cases a year to get a ‘satisfactory’ rating on their
performance evaluations.”346 As a result, IJs are encouraged to adjudicate
applications for relief as expeditiously as possible, often leading to adverse
consequences for noncitizens who are further unable to receive the attention
their cases desperately require.347 Given the backdrop of a neglectful
immigration justice system, the Court’s holding in Pereida is even more
unacceptable because it violates the spirit of the Sixth Amendment by
harming pro se immigrants and deprives noncitizens of plea deals that may
help them remain in the United States.
By placing the burden on the noncitizen to show that their conviction
was not disqualifying, the Court’s holding in Pereida will likely damage the
administrative efficiency of the immigration justice system, which is illequipped to conduct such inquiries.348 Moreover, the Court’s holding is
injurious to the spirit of the Sixth Amendment as the lack of predictability in
immigration proceedings and the need for greater factfinding will harm
immigrants facing crimmigration consequences.
CONCLUSION
In Pereida v. Wilkinson, the Supreme Court found that, to be eligible for
discretionary relief such as cancellation of removal under the INA,
noncitizens bear the burden of proving that they were not convicted of a
disqualifying offense.349 In reaching this conclusion, the Court failed to
apply the categorical approach framework intended by Congress based on the
plain meaning of the statute.350 Courts have consistently found that the term
“convicted of” triggers the application of the categorical approach351 and
forecloses the need for a burdensome and largely disfavored evidentiary
hearing.352 Regardless, the Court abrogated the categorical approach’s
application even though the “convicted of” language has consistently been
maintained by Congress and language ordinarily indicating that a
circumstance-specific approach should apply is not present.353 The Court’s
holding will lead to absurd results where an otherwise-qualified noncitizen

346. Panelists Debate How to Fix a Broken Immigration Court System, supra note 343 (quoting
Judge Slavin, who stated that “[n]o other American courts have such a quota . . . . ‘The only other
court that we found that has [a quota] is in the People’s Republic of China’”).
347. Id.
348. See supra Section IV.C.1.
349. Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 767 (2021).
350. See supra Section IV.A.1.
351. See supra notes 203–209 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 210–222 and accompanying text.
353. See supra Section IV.A.2.

784

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:747

will be unable to obtain a cancellation of removal order due to the mere
failure of a state court to adequately maintain the record.354
Moreover, the Court’s holding misinterprets its own precedent355 on this
issue and declines to follow a line of cases that indicate that ambiguities
within criminal statutes should be construed in the noncitizen’s favor, as the
conviction cannot necessarily be found to involve disqualifying conduct.356
The Court’s novel burden-shifting framework has not served as the basis for
the Court’s reasoning in prior cases357 and will lead to the inconsistent results
the categorical approach is intended to prevent.358
Finally, the Court failed to recognize the harmful effect this ruling will
have on the efficiency of the immigration justice system.359 The Court’s
holding will require IJs to engage in laborious factfinding proceedings to
determine the nature of a noncitizen’s conviction360 at a time when the EOIR
is struggling to keep up with its swelling docket.361 The Court’s holding will
also have harmful Sixth Amendment implications on immigrants seeking
relief.362 By placing the burden on a noncitizen to show that their conviction
was not disqualifying, the Court has abrogated the categorical approach’s
predictability, which ordinarily allows prosecutors to fashion safe-harbor
plea deals to protect underrepresented noncitizens from deportation.363 In the
context of an unsatisfactory immigration justice system, the Court’s holding
will aggravate Sixth Amendment concerns and will subject immigrants to an
uphill climb in obtaining relief from deportation.364

354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

See supra Section IV.A.3.
See supra Section IV.B.
See supra notes 261–267 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 272–277 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 278–283 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 286–290 and accompanying text.
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